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Abstract. Visual cryptography depends on two shares. The initial configuration, 
extra security bits and the number of the rule for the CA along with the number of 
computed steps serve as a password for a visually encrypted image. The second 
share could contain a predefined pattern; the developed algorithm uses a snap-
shot of a CA after a certain number of steps to generate the predefined share. 
Only one of these shares has to be random. The developed encryption system is a 
hybrid between visual and classical cryptographic approaches. It requires less 
storage space compared to a standalone visual encryption system and relies on 
Rule 30’s tested statistically significant randomness. 
Keywords: Cellular Automata, CA Rule 30, Cryptography, One Time Pad, 
Visual Cryptography. 
1 Introduction 
Visual cryptography [1-2] is broad in definition and applicability [3-23], and there are 
many methods used in encrypting visual data.  In essence, an image is converted into 
one or more images, which in isolation convey no information whatsoever. However, 
with a proper means to decrypt those images, one can display the original data. 
During Eurocrypt ’94, Moni Naor and Adi Shamir [1] proposed a novel visual 
cryptographic method.  Their method was based on the one time pad system of en-
cryption. In its most basic form an image is split into two derived images or ‘shares.’ 
One share acts as a key and the other as a cipher. Each one, when viewed in isolation 
from the other, displays no meaningful data.  However, when they are superimposed a 
discernible image can be viewed. 
The advantage of their method lies in its security and practicality. It is completely 
secure due to the fact that without all the shares the original visual data cannot be 
retrieved.  Also, the encrypted shares are generated in a random manner to ensure that 
no date can be retrieved from a single share.  Its practicality on the other hand lies in 
computational decryption. Printing the shares on transparencies and superimposing 
them on top of one another will achieve the desired decryption. 
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2.4 Visual Encryption via Cellular Automata 
In the original visual cryptography methodology, the first share is produced randomly, 
without any predefined rule or pattern. Following the typical visual cryptography 
method, the second and complementary share is generated based on the original im-
age’s pixel information and the pixel pattern in the first share.  As a result, every visual 
encryption needs to have both shares in order to generate the original image.  Con-
trasting with the common visual cryptography, our proposed method uses the CA rule 
30 and only one share from the original image, instead of the common method in visual 
encryption where two shares are needed. 
One of the many capabilities of a CA is that of generation or growth of patterns 
based on a simple set of initial rules.  Dr. Stephen Wolfram provides evidence that 
randomness is found in the sequence generation in the time sequences that are created 
from running certain CA rules [41]. This capacity of random production can be ex-
ploited in visual cryptography so we could generate a complete share, starting with no 
more than a relatively small password taken from an image. 
To encode an image using this method, a password would need to be generated. As 
an example for proving this method, the password is predefined to be 100 bits as a 
minimum size.  The value of the password is extracted from the first row of pixels in 
the original image.  If the first row is not sufficient to generate a 100-bit password, 
random bits are padded on to complete the 100 bits (but as a practical matter, this is not 
restricted to that number of bits, and could be greater than that).  The CA rule 30 initial 
conditions are (i) the randomized first row and (ii) the initial two-color pixelized pic-
ture (see Fig. 6), with the picture’s initial width and height. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Original Image: Picture= {{1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0}, {0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0}, {0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0, 
0},{0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0},{1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1},{1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1},{0,1,0,1,1,1,1,0,1,0},{0,0,1,0
,0,0,0,1,0,0},{0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0},{0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1}} 
ECA rule 30, with a window  size of 200, appears to be adequate as a random number 
generator [42], passing all but one statistical test out of complete set of NIST statistical 
tests for randomness [43]. 
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In the implementation of this methodology, the encryption and decryption process 
were programmed in Wolfram Mathematica. The following pseudocode is based on the 
Mathematica code that demonstrates how that was achieved starting with the original 
image as shown below. 
If size appropriate 
 Create matrix of password for CA 
 Create cellular automaton rule 30 
 Replace all values “1” for found in matrix password 
 Create initial conditions for cellular automaton and 
  extra bits 
 Generates cumulative sums of the elements in the list 
 Concatenates the two lists 
 Creates matrix of trimmed lists 
 Create cellular automaton rule 30, initial conditions  
  of concatenation of the two lists 
Each pixel in the CA grown share is then represented by 4 pixels: 
While reading the matrix of the original image 
 Make Share1 by replacing elements, assigning 1 to the double 
size of the original image 
 Create new image 
Afterwards, the second share can be generated using the original image’s pixel data and 
the relative organization of pixels in the CA grown share, which is similar to the 




Fig. 7. (a) Generation of a random share from the CA rule 30 and initial conditions. The mini-
mum password size = 100 bits regardless of original image size.  (b) The random share with 
each pixel represented by 4 alternating black and white pixels. 
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2.5 Visual Decryption via Cellular Automata 
The output of the encryption process is a single share (Fig. 8). The password used for 
the encryption process is needed to decrypt the share and retrieve the original image. 
That password along with rule 30 is used to generate the other share needed to produce 
the original image. Similar to the initial stage in the encryption process, the password is 
used to grow the share. That share’s pixels are then represented by four pixels each. 
Finally, the original image can be retrieved by superimposing the CA grown share with 
the single encrypted share.  In a post-processing method, the image can be cleaned up 








(a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 8. Visual Decoding Process: the addition of the shares (a) and (b) reconstruction of the 
original image (c) 
Discussion 
The original Visual Cryptography method usually relies on a one-time pad encryption 
method. Two shares are generated, where one acts as a cipher while the other acts as a 
key. Both the cipher and its respective key have to be present in image formats. 
Moreover, each of those images is double the width and double the height of the 
original image’s dimensions. The resultant size increase per image ends up at eight 
times the original image’s size. This is a large size increase in addition to the incon-
venience of storing two separate shares per image. 
Our method solves these two issues.  We only need to store a single encrypted share 
and that share acts as our cipher. To decrypt the share, a visual key needs to be present. 
Unlike the original method, however, the key does not have to be stored as a full share. 
We only need the original 100-bit password, and from it an entire visual key can be 
grown via CA Rule 30. 
This method is not more convenient as a result of storing a single share rather than 
two, but also more efficient. Only a single share needs to be stored, which is four times 
the size of the original image and half the size required by the common method. 
= + 
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Conclusion 
The method described here builds on the original Visual Cryptography method pre-
sented by Naor and Shamir. It utilizes CA’s ability to generate pseudorandom patterns 
from a simple starting point to grow a share from a predefined password. This approach 
is both more convenient and efficient than the original Visual Cryptography approach.  
A working demonstration of this research can be found in the Wolfram Demonstration 
Project site [44]. 
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